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I. INTRODUCTION. 
Some recent English cases, 
erected a species of trust, 
adopted in New Zealand, have 
exact origin and character 
unknown, which gives a share in the home to a de facto 
spouse~ when the couple separate regardless of the legal 
title. The court's ready intervention in the area of a 
man's (or woman's) private property is surprising. So is 
the post-war blossoming of the law of trusts in cases of 
matrimonial, or de facto's property. Such activity 
usually shows a defect in the law, or an inability to 
cope with social changes. This paper proposes to study 
the new use of trusts and how it affects the property of 
de facto spouses. 
It will first seewhy this trust developed and what need 
it fulfilled. It will next consider the trust itself, 
and try to fit it into some traditional classification 
of trusts. It will study the terms of the new trust and 
see how successfully it copes with the problems which the 
law apparently could not handle. The paper will then 
move on to the particular situation of de facto spouses. 
It will examine the traditional approach to disentangling 
their property rights, and try to see how much change 
the new cases bring. It is proposed to look at de facto 
spouses in the light of broad policy, and try to decide 
whether they should share freely in each other's property. 
Finally, the paper will look at the trust and alternative 
methods of giving de facto spouses a share in the home. 
This necessarily involves consideration of what a fair 
share would be and how to achieve it in all the vastly 
different cases which come before the courts. 
The paper tries to move from the cases to a broad open view 
and analysis of the legal position of the de facto spouse. 
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This was thought to be a more suitable approach than 
a rigorou s case-analysis. The cases are as yet 
few, their rationes widely and often contradictorily 
phrased. The real question is the social one of how 
far the courts will take the law, not the strictly 
legal question of what the law is. It is more 
realistic, and more enlightening, to look at the 
cases in this way, and so to look directly at the 
questions the courts were considering. 
The paper concentrates throughout on the home, since 
it is the major asset for the majority of couples. 
The same principles, however, apply to all the 
couple's property. Similarly, it is usually the 
mistress who is claiming, so some comments refer only 
to her. Exactly the same rules govern the male partner's 
claims, and men have successfully claimed shares from 
their mistresses. 
The problem is essentially a practical one. The legal 
theory has been shaped and adapted to meet a practical 
need. So this paper will begin by looking at the case 
of an unmarried couple who have set up r.ome together, to 
see how the law classifies and treats their situation. 
It will try to understand why so many difficulties and 
complications arise in this classification. 
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II THE PLIGHT OF THE DE FACTO SPOUSE WHY WAS EQUITY INVOKED? 
The basic problem lies in the very nature of a couple's 
living together permanently, with or without benefit 
of wedlock, so it can never be solved or removed but 
only remedied. It has been repeatedly pointed out in 
the cases, (1) that when a couple set up house together 
they do not plan for their eventual separation. They 
work on the assumption that they will remain together, 
and pool their resources with little or no thought of 
who should have legal title to what. It is usually the 
man who is in charge of the couple's business affairs, 
so property may be conveyed into his name for convenience 
or because he can more easily raise finance. Living 
expenses or mortgage instalments may be paid by either, 
depending on convenience rather than ownership. If the 
couple do separate, there is a glorious muddle as to 
who owns or should own much of the property. Often the 
legal titles bear little relationship to the parties' 
contributions or their understanding of the situation. 
The position for married couples is covered in New Zealand 
by the Matrimonial Property Act 1963 and the Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1963. These alleviate the harshness and 
injustice which would result from enforcing legal 
ownership by giving the court a wide discretion to 
distribute the property, and in particular the home, as 
it thinks fit. ( 2) The Matrimonial Property Bill 1975 
would change the rationale of the court's intervention and 
by clause 49 would also apply to de facto spouses who have 
lived together for two or more years. 
(1) Lord Denning M.R in his own inimitable way describes 
the position of legal spouses in Appleton v. Appleton 
(1965] l.W.L.R.25; (1965) l ALLE.R.44 (C.A.) and of 
de facto spouses in Eves v. Eves (1975) l W.L.R. 1338; 
(1975) 3 ALL E.R. 768 (C.A.) 
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It would provide for an automatic equal division of most 
of the couple's property, subject to proof that one had 
not done his fair share of the work. The rest of the 
"matrimonial" property would be split in proportion to 
contributions. The bill was aimed at recognising a 
wife's contribution in bringing up children and keeping 
house efficiently, so it redefines "contribution" very 
broadly to include these and other indirect contributions 
to assets. Until the bill becomes law, and for shorter 
relationships, de facto spouses must find their remedy 
in equity or common-law. 
Couples in the past have typically resorted to equity 
for relief. A distinct class of implied trust developed 
to cover the matrimonial situation, where large numbers 
of people were affected by the injustice of the strict 
law, and was extended to the analagous situation of de 
facto spouses. That trust forms the subject for this 
paper. In view of its prevalence, a remarkable amount 
of uncertainty surrounds its nature. In the leading cases 
( 3) 
of Pettitt v. Pettitt and Gissing v. Gissing (4) the House 
of Lords accepted that such a trust existed, but did not 
decide whether it was a resulting or constructive trust. (5) 
This is a vital point, since the two are quite different, 
giving the court different reasons and scope for intervening, 
and different remedies. 
(2) Matrimonial Property Act 1963, SS. 5, 6. Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1963, SS. 41, 58. 
(3) (1970) A.C. 777. 
(4) (1971) A.C. 886. 
(5) In Gissing, Lord Reid at 896, Lord Morris of Borth -
y-Gest at 898, Viscount Dilhorne at 901, and Lord 
Diplock at 905 all left the question open. Lord 
Pearson at 902 said there was a resulting trust. 
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Lord Upjohn in Pettitt clearly thought it was a resulting 
trust, since he studied the leading cases on resulting 
trusts in detail at 814-815 and treated them as authorities. 
The law-lords used the trichotomy "resulting constructive 
or implied trusts " . This terminology is curious; the 
three categories are not mutually exclusive. The trust is 
not explicitly declared in the sort of cases we are 
considering, so it must be implied or else arise by 
operation of law if the latter, then it will be a 
constructive trust imposed by the court. If the former, 
then it will be a resulting trust, implied from the 
parties' behaviour. 
. .. /4a 
III A. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS. 
The problem may be partly due to the lack of a satisfactory 
definition of constructive trusts. The law on this point 
is in a state of considerable uncertainty (6), which this 
paper could not hope to determine. Mahon J. in Carly v. 
Farrelly (7) recently accepted as authoritative Edmund 
Davies L.J. 's formulation in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Herbert 
Smith (No. 2) (8) the court would find a constructive 
trust when there was a want of probity in the trustee. This 
is rather an indication of the underlying principle than a 
test of the particular situations in which constructive 
trusts will be found, a seemingly arbitrary assortment. As 
yet this sort of family trust has not been authoritatively 
recognised as such a particular situation. The general 
principle requires some fault, or some use of a position 
of trust; the constructive trust is not a general remedy 
for injustice, as it is in America. It is imposed at 
the court's discretion, without reference to the parties' 
intentions. This makes it very flexible, but uncertain 
as to application and terms. 
III B. Resulting Trusts 
This is a narrower and more straightforward concept. 
Anyone paying part of the price of property is presumed 
to be the beneficial owner under a resulting trust in 
proportion to his contribution. Payment is taken to show 
~he intentions to acquire and to give a share, and the 
presumption is rebuttable only by evidence that the parties 
intended otherwise. (9) 
(6) But for a lucid survey, see A.J. Oakley, "Has the 
Constructive Trust Become a General Equitable Remedy?''( ~ ~~ 
C.L.P. 17. 
(7) (1975) 1 N.Z.L.R. 356, 367. 
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(8) (1969) 2 Ch. 276, 300-301. 
(9) Dyer v. Dyer (1788) 2 Cox 92; 30 E.R. 42. 
Wray v. Steele (1814) 2 V. & B. 388. 
Contributions after the purchase, such as paying mortgage 
installments, are relevant only as evidence of either a 
trust at the time of the purchase or a subsequent agreement 
to create a trust. Contributions do not give a share in 
themselves; only the intention does that. This is in 
marked contrast to constructive trusts. 
III C. Which is the Matrimonial Trust? 
Which sort of trust is being found in the matrimonial cases? 
The House of Lords in Pettitt and Gissing insisted on an 
actual intention being necessary to found the trust. Shares 
were to be precisely calculated from contributions; the 
court was not to fix the shares it thought fair. This 
strongly suggests that the court was finding a resulting 
trust. Efstratiou v. Glantschnig (10) is a clear example 
of the resulting trust operating in a matrimonial situation, 
as found by the New Zealand Court of Appeal. 
Yet the English Court of Appeal's readiness to intervene 
has led to suggestions that it is really using constructive 
trusts without admitting it. (11) This would explain the 
completely different approaches taken by it and the House 
of Lords. The Court of Appeal is much more flexible, 
seems to be bound by fewer or more nebulous rules, finds 
trusts more readily (12, and will fix shares with a freer 
hand. In Eves v. Eves (13), Lord Denning M.R. explicitly 
declared the trust was "a constructive trust of a new model". 
(10) (1972] N.Z.L. R. 594, 598. 
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(11) Nathan and Marshall, The Law of Trusts (6 ed. 1975) 
p.p. 334, 335. 
(12) Henry Lesser in "The Acquisition of Inter Vivos 
Matrimonial Property Rights in English Law, A 
Doctrinal Melting Pot" (1973) 23 Univ of Toronto 
L.J. 148 argues that constructive trusts are harder 
to find than resulting trusts since there is an 
additional requirement of proof of unconscionable 
behaviour. In practice, however, the Court of 
Appeal seems to have little trouble in finding this. 
It is not an additional but an alternative 
requirement, and much easier to assert. 
(13) (1975) 1 W.L . R. 1338, 1341; 
771 (C.A.) 
(1975) 3 All E.R. 768, 
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The facts of Eves were unique in this line of cases in 
that the man actually lied and "tricked" his mistress 
out of the property, giving some reason to find a 
constructive trust. It would be harder to find a want 
of probity in the usual case, such as Gissing. One 
could argue that Mr. Gissing would show a lack of 
probity in breaking the implied agreement that his wife 
have a share. This argument has all the disadvantages 
of a resulting trust, adds yet another artificial stage 
to the theory, and loses the resulting trust's certainty 
of quantification and existence. 
The alternative reason is that the husband shows a lack 
of probity is not rewarding his wife's contributions. The 
House of Lords specifically delcared that this was not the 
courts' concern but Parliament's ( 14) . I would agree. The 
reform needed in this area is basic to matrimonial law, 
and to our views of marriage and de facto unions. To 
smuggle it in under the guise of constructive trusts, in 
the present state of the law, involves pretending that one 
spouse is acting dishonourably, and would make for a 
strained and artificial matrimonial law. It would also 
distort the law of constructive trusts. They were never in 
New Zealand intended to be found whenever the courts thought 
the law would produce unjust enrichment of an inequity. 
This would make all law to uncertain, and too reliant so I 
would support recent attempts to make the constructive trust 
a general remedy 
judgements. 
(14a) on the court's unfettered moral 
(14) Lord Dilhorne in Gissing at 901, Lord Reid in 
Pettitt at 795, 797, Lord Morris of Borth-y-gest at 
803, Lord Hodson at 810-811, Lord Upjohn at 817. 
(14a) e.g. Hussey v.Palmer (1972) 1 W.L.R. 1286; Binions v. 
Evans 0- 97 2J Cl,, 359. 
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Matrimonial property is one area where certainty is 
particularly desirable, so applying the constructive 
trusts to this sort of situation is not the most 
appropriate remedy. I would not go as far as Bagnall J., 
who in Cowcher v. Cowcher (15) e quated justice with law, 
but I do agree with him that justice is best attained by 
applying sure and settled principles. 
These questions will be discussed in greater detail later. 
Suffice it to note here that the House of Lords is still 
a higher authority than the Court of Appeal, and its view 
must be taken as the law. So the trust over a couple's 
property is not an unfettered constructive trust, as the 
law stands. 
(15) [1972) 1 W.L.R. 425, 430; (1972] 1 All E.R. 943, 948. 
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IV The Basic Theory of the Trust. 
Let us consider the case of a mistress who runs the home, 
brings up the children, and holds down a part-time job: 
can she claim a share in the home? Pettitt established 
that the couple must actually intend to found a trust (16). 
The court can only infer an implicit common understanding 
if there is some evidence to support this. It is not 
enough that reasonable spouses would have intended to 
share, nor that this couple would have if they had thought 
about it. This was a policy decision by the House of 
Lords, weighing individual justice against the un-
desirability of the courts' making law in this area. 
The House will not draw inferences of intention very freely. 
Certainly merely spending money on the family does not 
raise a presumption of trust. Contributions to the price, 
by the law of resulting trusts, are presumed to show an 
intention to share. Doing repairs, renovations, or 
decoration does not in itself show an intention to share. 
The parties need not have been thinking of legal consequences 
or exact proportions, so long as they intended to share. 
Lord Diplock in Gissing was the most generous of the law-
lords 
(16) 
( 17) . 
Lord Morris of Borth-y-gest in Pettitt at 804. 
Lord Hodson 11 11 810. 
Lord Upjohn 11 11 818. 
Lord Diplock at p. 823 took the contrary view. In 
Gissing at 904 he accepted that his former view was 
in a minority and that the majority view had become 
the law. Lord Reid also took the minority view in 
Pettitt at 795-6, but maintained it in Gissing at 
895, 897. His view cannot be taken to represent 
the law. 
(17) Except Lord Reid: see note 16. 
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He saw the trust as either a constructive trust imposed 
for bad behaviour (18) or else as a resulting trust, 
for which he would readily infer intentions: He defined 
intention, contractually, as that which a reasonable 
man would infer from the other's words and behaviour. 
Two intentions thus inferred would add up to a common 
intention (19). This formulation is almost a way of 
avoiding the need for intention, as Lord Diplock tried 
and failed to do in Pettitt. The other law-lords took 
fairly conservative attitudes to inferring intention. In 
the two cases which came before the House, the decisions 
of the Court of Appeal were unanimously reversed and no 
trusts were found. Mr. Pettitt, in particular, had spent 
£723 on his wife's house, and done much work, and yet 
no intention that he acquire a share was inferred from 
this. This was probably an accura·te analysis of the 
couple's understanding, but produced an unfair result. 
This diffidence is in marked contrast to the Court of 
Appeal's readiness to infer agreements from very little 
evidence. The need for an intention is obviously 
undesirable. In theory, the court is rewarding these 
spouses calculating enough to sit down and reckon their 
respective shares. In practice, as Lord Reid pointed out 
in Gissing (20), it is penalizing honest couples who will 
admit they never thought about the matter, and rewarding 
those "sophisticated" enough to concoct evidence of an 
intention. It is an absurd test to apply to the intimacy 
of family dealings. Lord Hodson commented, "The conception 
of a normal married couple spending the long winter evenings 
hammering out agreements about their possessions appears 
grotesque ... " (21) 
The House was forced into this unsatisfactory approach by 
using the law of resulting trusts. The Court of Appeal, led 
by Lord Denning, simply ignored the law and the House of 
Lord's pronouncements. 
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(1 9) This contractural view of intention was echoed by 
Megaw L.J. in Hazell v. Hazell (1972.) 1 W.L.R., 
301 , 306, where he said that intention could be 
presumed where a reasonable sensible spouse would 
have realised the other was contributing in order 
to acquire a share. 
(20) at 897. 
( 21) Pettitt, at 810; (1972) 1 All E.R. 923, 928 (C.A.) 
V Practical Problems. 
These often arise in adapting the law of resulting trusts 
to the domestic situation. 
V-A Contributions after purchase. 
Contributions of money or work to the property after its 
purchase raise no presumption of resulting trust and are 
treated as a gift unless they can be referred to an 
agreement or unless there is estoppel (22). Jansen v. 
Jansen (23) shows what strong facts are necessary to refer 
contributions to an implied agreement. The husband gave 
up his work as a student to improve his wife's flats, and 
the Court of Appeal was prepared to imply from this an 
agreement that he have a share (24). Lord Denning M.R. 
in Button v. Button (25) tried to set up a trust, which 
was quoted with approval in the House of Lords : (26) 
(22) 
"(The husband) should not be entitled to a share in 
the house simply by doing the 'do-it-yourself jobs' 
which husbands often do. He may, however, be 
entitled when the work is of a kind which normally 
a contractor is employed to do ... " 
"The wife does not get a share in the house simply 
because she cleans the walls or works in the garden 
or helps her husband with the painting and decorating. 
Those are the sort of things which a wife does for 
the benefit of the family without altering the title 
to, or interests in the property." 
This is traditional trust doctrine as expounded by 
Lord Morris of Borth-y-gest in Pettitt at 804, 
Lord Hodson at 809, 810, Lord Upjohn at 818 and 
Lord Diplock at 822 (as revised by himself in 
Gissing). Lord Reid at 795 thought the same 
principles ought to apply for improvements as for 
money contributions. Lord Denning M.R. in Hazell 
v. Hazell at 304 rejected the requirement of 
referability and hoped to hear less of it in the 
future. He purported to be following Lords Reid 
and Pearson in Gissing. But Lord Pearson at 903 
and Lord Reid at 896 themselves appear to require 
that contributions be referable to the acquisition 
of the property. 
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Lord Denning's words were strictly obiter, since 
on the facts of the case there was a clear link . 
Of the other two judges in the Court of Appeal, 
Stephenson L.J. merely agreed, and Megaw L.J. 
did not adopt Lord Denning's view. It is too 
widely out of line with the views of the House 
of Lords to be taken as the law. J.M. Eekelaar 
in "The Matrimonial Home in the Court of Appeal", 
(1972) 88L.Q.R.333 points out some of the problems 
which would result and deplores the breach between 
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. 
(23) (1965) P. 478 (C.A.) 
(24) The wife offered and the husband refused a fixed 
sum a s payment for his services. In view of this, 
Lord Hodson in Pettitt at 809 and Lord Upjohn at 
818 felt the presumption of agreement was rebutted. 
But Lord Reid at 796 and Lord Diplock at 826 felt 
the court was justified in implying a c ommon 
intention since the strength of the presumption 
would override the evidence. The discussion turns 
on the interpretation of the facts; it is clear 
that all the lords thought non-monetary 
contributions could give a share in an appropriate 
case. 
(25) (1968) 1 W.L. R. 457, 461-462; Q.968] l All E. R. 1064, 
1066-1067 (C.A.) 
(26) Lord Reid in Pettitt at 796, Lord Hodson at 807, Lord 
Upjohn at 818. 
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As Dankwerts L.J. commented: (27) 
" •.• where the claim is based upon work done, it 
seems to me the matter is more problematical 
(than for money contributions) and it is more 
difficult to ascertain an intention to give any 
particular share." 
This attitude is probably based on sound common-sense, 
since parties do not intend household chores to transfer 
title, and also on the administrative difficulty of 
evaluating all the minor contributions a couple make 
during their relationship. 
V-B Indirect Contributions. 
One party may contribute indirectly by relieving the other 
of expenditure. A wife or mistress may pay all the house-
hold expenses so that the man can put all his money to 
paying off the mortgage. The law of resulting trusts 
traditionally would not extend to this situation, though 
The there is no logical reason why it should not. (28) 
English Court of Appeal early declared that if a contrirution 
was substantial, 
in the property. 
then it need not be direct to give a share 
( 29) It is not clear how far the House of 
Lords endorses this view. It made no definite pronouncement 
on the point in Pettitt and Gissing and its dicta can be 
taken as hinting in either direction. (30) The Court of 
Appeal in subsequent cases has not felt that the House 
limited its style or scope. 
(27) Button 463, 1068. 
(28) The Supreme Court of Canada left the question of 
indirect contributions undecided in Murdoch v. 
Murdoch (1974) 41 D.L.R. (3d) 367, while accepting 
that logic required that services should be able 
to found a resulting trust. 
(29) Tulley v. Tulley 109 Sol J. 956. 
(30) Lesser at 194 argues that in Gissing the House of 
Lords said beneficial interests could not be acquired 
solely by indirect contributions. 
( 3 0) Cont ' d .. 
Cf. Peter Jacobson "Murdoch v. Murdoch: Just about 
what the ordinary rancher's wife does'' (1974) 20 
McGill L.J. 308, 316. I submit that Lord Diplock 
at 909, Lord Pearson at 903, and Lord Reid at 896 
would allow indirect contributions to give a share, 
while Lord Morris of Borth-y-gest and Viscount 
Dilhorne are neutral. 
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In Falconer v. Falconer (31) Lord Denning M.R. declared: 
"So long as there is a substantial financial contribution 
towards the family expenses it raises the inference of a 
trust." He repeated this view in Hargrave v. Newton (32). 
This is a flat contradiction of Pettitt and Gissing, and 
cannot be reconciled with the law of resulting trusts. In 
Hazell v. Hazell he said the wife could get a share by 
reason of her contributions whether or not there was an 
agreement. This, too, is indirect opposition to the 
view expressed by the House of Lords. Bagnall J. in 
Cowcher v. Cowcher laboured heroically to reconcile the 
Court of Appeal with the House of Lords, producing some 
very strange interpretations of the former. In fact, the 
Court of Appeal was clearly contradicting the House. In so 
far as it did this, its pronouncements are not the law. 
Its view that indirect contributions referable to the home's 
acquisition give a prime facie share is reconcileable, and 
can be taken as the law unless overruled. 
Hazell shows that this is the fairer view. After the husband 
bought the house, the couple discussed how it was to be paid 
for, and the wife agreed to take reduced housekeeping money 
and to go out to work. Her pay was thereafter spent on the 
family, his on the mortgage. So her contributions were 
clearly referable to the purchase, and she worked at least 
as hard as him, running the home and holding down a job. 
Surely it should be presumed that this contribution entitled 
her to a share. The Court of Appeal thought so. 
(31) tl970J l W.L.R. 1333, 1336; (1970) 3 All E.R. 449, 452 (C.A.) 
(32) (1971) 1 W.L.R. 1611; (1971) 3 All E.R. 866, (C.A.) 
Logically, it seems desirable that indirect contribution 
can be taken to give a share. Since the theory of resulting 
trusts is that the court is trying to establish the parties' 
intentions, substantial indirect contributions referable to 
the house's acquisition should, in common sense, raise the 
same rebuttable presumption of intention as direct ones. 
They will still be harder to prove, and harder to relate 
to the acquisition of the house. Once a spouse has conquered 
these hurdles, it is harsh and unfair to impose a further 
requirement. There is no theoretical need to do so, not to 
fina a trust prima facie shown. It may well be artificial 
to infer an additional intention but no more so than for 
direct contributions. 
V-C Indirect Non-Financial Contributions. 
As we have seen, direct non-financial contributions can 
give a share in tre property, although they are not covered 
by the traditional doctrine of resulting trusts and must be 
fairly substantial to be considered. There is no reason in 
principle why indirect non-financial contributions cannot 
equally found a share. 
Proof will be harder: the contribution must be referable to 
the house's acquisition, and the claimant must perform more 
than the normal wifely or husband's duties so there is no 
fear of opening the floodgates. 
There is no relevant case concerning de facto spouses, but 
cases on matrimonial property show the court's approach. 
WlEre a wife works in her husband's business (33), or takes 
in a lodger (34), and the profits are used to buy a home, 
she has been awarded a share. Her contribution may be valued 
as one half (35) , but the court will give a greater share 
to the initial owner of the business, even after 30 years of 
working on it together (36). 
. .. /14 
So, though indirect non-financial contributions are a 
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VI The Traditional Position of the De facto Spouse. 
This, roughly, was the law of trusts as it developed with 
reference to married couples. In Cooke v. Head (37) the 
court of Appeal applied it to give a mistress a third share 
in the home. The Court had traditionally taken an unsym-
pathetic view of such claims. (38) 
In Diwell v. Fames (39} the court said that mistresses were 
not to be treated like wives. (40) One reason was that the 
court thought spouses were subject to special considerations, 
(41) so that the maxim "equity is equity" could be applied 
more readily to them. The House of Lords in Pettitt later 
dispelled this theory and disapproved of this use of the 
maxim. Hodson L.J. (42) said that spouses were to be 
treated differently because they do not in most cases regulate 
their business dealings formally. But on the facts, this 
couple had clearly regulated their dealings as informally as 
any spouses. Their relationship lasted sixteen years, and 
to treat them as strangers is unrealistic. Their lives and 
their property were completely merged. They thought of their 
interests as joint, of their property as shared. In any 
event, the House of Lords made it clear that marriage does 
not affect property rights. Husbands and wives, too, are 
treated as legal strangers. The relationship is relevant 
only as evidence of what the couple's actions would have 
meant to each other. 
( 3 7) [19721 1 ~.L.R. 578; (19721 2 All E. R. 38, (C.A.) 
(38) e.g. Rider v. Kidder (1805) 10 Ves. 360; 32 E. R. 884. 
(3 9) r1959"J 1 W.L.R. 624; (1959') 2 All E. R. 37 9, (C.A.) 
(40) W. L. R. at 627, 628, 635, 641; All E. R. at 381, 382, 387, 
391-2. 
(41) W.L.R. at 627, 628, 632, 633, 636, 637, 639, 641, All E.R. 
at 381, 382, 384, 385, 388, 389, 390, 391-2. 
(42) Diwell 627-9, 381-3. 
Ormerod L.J. (43) and Willmer L.J. (44) said that even if 
there were evidence of a common intention to share, this 
would depend on an agreement or contract. Such a contract 
would be unenforceable, since made for immoral consideration. 
I submit that this reasoning is fallacious. In New Zealand, 
at any rate, 
declaration, 
there need be no consideration for a 
express or implied, of trust (45). Moreover, 
the parties were agreeing to pool their property and work for 
their mutual benefit. The mistress would contribute her 
money and in return receive a beneficial interest in the 
property. While their immoral relationship may well have 
been the motive for their agreement, it formed no part of 
the consideration, which was fairly balanced on both sides. 
It may be that the mistress contributed most. I would 
submit that this should be reflected in the proportion of 
the house she gets. It is absurd to postulate that her 
contribution was made solely in consideration of the husband 
having sex with her. The agreement which she was alleging 
was exactly contrary to this. Equally, to claim that the 
only consideration for him was sex is just not borne out by 
the facts. Since the couple were living together before the 
house was bought, and there was no suggestion of their 
relationship ending, the sex could not have been the 
consideration for entering into a new agreement. Buying the 
house was a business and property venture to which the 
couple's sexual relationship was not material. Their case is 
the same as that of members of a family entering into a deal 
out of natural affection. (46) 
consideration from both sides, 
So long as there is 
the contract is binding. 
affection is not part of the deal. 
consideration. 
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Mr. Diwell and his mistress first rented a house, she 
providing 2/3 of the rent, and then as sitting tenants 
bought it very cheaply. The house was bought on mortgage 
in his name for £900 with no deposit, but she made all 
the mortgage payments till it was resold, i.e. £81. It 
fetched £2300 and another house was bought out-right with 
the proceeds. The Court, Willmer L.J. dissenting, held 
that the mistress's contributions to the rent were not a 
contribution to the price of the first house. Her share 
was therefore the proportion £81 formed to the first 
house's price, i.e. 9%. Willmer L.J. thought that 
contributing to the tenancy should be included in the price, 
since the tenancy enabled them to buy the house for 
considerably less than its real value. Ormerod L.J. thought 
that if the tenancy was to be considered, he would have 
agreed with Willmer J. in finding the shares too difficult 
to calculate. Then, since they would be roughly e qual, 
the court would have applied the maxim "equality is e quity". 
The case seems very unfair. The mistress contributed all 
the money and in return received 9% of the value o f their 
second house. If this was sold for its pu:i.rchase price of 
£1250 shw would have made a profit of £31.lOs. The 
husband's estate would make £1137.lOs just from the use of 
his name on the title and mortgage. Perhaps the injustice 
arises from the way the court assessed the relative value of 
money contributions and legal liability. They d id not really 
come to terms with mortgages. Their decision seems, however, 
to have been influenced by a distaste for de facto marriages. 
On their view of the matter, this was a resulting trust. The 
mistresse's share would grow bigger each time she paid a 
mortgage installment, till she could eventually acquire the 
whole house. 
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Would a new trust arise every time she made a payment, and 
altered her proportionate contribution? Or would there be 
one resulting trust, with the parties intending their 
shares to be shifting? The Court did not consider these 
questions. 
The doctrine of resulting trusts was designed to achieve 
rough justice between the parties by erecting a rebuttable 
presumption that contributions were intended to be 
proportionate to shares. I would submit that the facts of 
this case rebut the presumption, quite apart from the 
difficulties in evaluating contributions. The couple's 
behaviour, and in particular their letters, showed an 
intention to hold the house e qually toge ther. Two of the 
four judges - i.e. Willmer L.J. and the county court judge -
would have given the mistress a half-share. Willmer, L . J., 
however, would not have given effect to a mere agreement 
without consideration between de facto spouses, such as a 
postulate, since he would say immorality was the consideration, 
not generosity. This is the traditional view, and forms an 
additional obstacle for de facto spouses. He found the 
evidence raised a resulting trust for roughly e qual shares 
from roughly e qual contributions, so gave equal shares to 
settle the uncertainty. Since the resulting trust arises 
from a presumption as to the parties' intentions, it is 
curious that none of the judges thought that this presumed 
agreement was tainted by the immorality. They must have felt 
that so long as there was adequate consideration, the 
immorality was no part of it and was therefore irrelevant. 
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VII Cooke v. Head - A new departure. 
The Court of Appeal in Cooke paid little attention to Diwell's 
reasoning. Lord Denning M.R. noted (47) that the majority 
looked at actual financial contributions, but that Willmer 
L.J's approach was "more in accord with recent developments" 
•• ( 48) a comment which does not take into account the very 
traditional line of Willmer L.J. 's reasoning. Basically the 
court went its own way, The judgements show how far the 
Court of Appeal had gone beyond the House of Lords. It held 
that the same principles were applicable to husband wife as 
to man and mistress ( 49) • This accords with the House of 
Lords insistence that spouses are to be treated in the same 
way as everyone else. Karminski L.J. did say ... " 
"The principles of law in a case of this kind between 
a man and his mistress when they intend to set up a 
home together and intend also to marry when they are 
free is in no way different from the principles 
applicable in the cases of husband and wife." (50) 
But it is hard to see how his requirement of an intention to 
marry can be justified. If the parties intend to live 
together permanently, they are as likely to intend to share 
the house as a married couple. Even if they do not intend 
this, the evidence may still show an intention to share. 
The part of the judgements which is really open to attack is 
their interpretation of the general principles which are to be 
applied to legal and de facto spouses. Lord Denning stated 
"It is now held that, whenever two parties ·by their joint 
efforts acquire property to be used for their joint benefit, 
the courts may impose or impute a constructive or resulting 
trust . " (51) This seems to be virtually a resurrection of 
the doctrine of family assets. The Court took a wide 
discretion on itself, as 9 hen Lord Denning declared " .. we 
should decide what the shares should be ... " (52) The House of 
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Again he said, 
"I do not think it is right to approach this case by 
looking at the money contributions of each and dividing 
up the beneficial interest according to those 
contributions. The matter should be looked at more 
broadly, just as we do in husband and wife cases. We 
look to see what the equity is worth at the time when 
the parties separate. We assess the shares as at 
that time". (53) 
He quoted Lord Diplock at page 909 of Gissing in support of 
this. Lord Diplock was apparently considering the situation 
where the parties had agreed roughly on the formula by which 
shares were to be calculated, but had agreed to leave the 
actual calculation to be made when the house was sold or the 
mortgage paid. They had set up a trust with certain terms, 
though the parties had agreed to leave the calculation till 
later. This does not mean that the court can award shares 
however it feels is fair. The court can only carry out the 
quantification on the formul~ envisaged by the parties. This 
formula may be fairness, it may be in direct proportion to 
contributions, it may be whatever the couple choose. Lord 
Diplock was the only law lord to postulate this sort of delayed 
agreement between parties. The House of Lords can not have 
envisaged that it would be very common. All the law lords said 
that the court could not alter the terms of the trust, once 
fixed, in the light of later circumstances. The court is not 
entitled to do what it thinks just in the changed circumstances, 
only to enforce the trust. Lord Diplock himself said at page 
906, that the parties' behaviour after the trust was made was 
relevant only as evidence of it. It did not create new rights. 









VIII Eves v. Eves: More Lord Denning. 
In Eves v. Eves (54) the court went further still. Unlike 
Cooke, there was no financial contribution at all. The 
mistress, Janet, stripped wallpaper, and painted woodwork, 
cabinets and brick-work. She used a 141b sledgehammer to 
break up concrete which covered the front garden, and put 
the pieces in a skip. She worked in the garden and helped 
to demolish and replace a shed. There was an understanding 
between the couple that she was to have a share in the 
house, but it was bought in his name. Love he t o ld her was 
because she was a minor, but admitted in court that he had 
used this as an excuse, and never intended to share the 
ownership. At first instance, Pennywick, V.C. said that 
she made sufficient contribution to found a resulting trust, 
but he could not link her contributions to their agreement. 
In the Court of Appeal, Brightman J, with whom Browne L.R. 
concurred, found that there was a common understanding and 
agreement. He felt able to enfer that the mistress worked as 
a result of the agreement. 
Lord Denning went further. He said (55) that there was a 
constructive, not a resulting trust. The man had made a 
declaration of trust, and should be held to it because to 
do otherwise would be inequitable. Her share was whatever the 
court thought fair. (56). He fixed this at a quarter. This 
figure was apparently plucked from the air, and not justified 
by any of the judges. In view of the little work she did, it 
seems remarkable that she got so much. 
Mr. Pettitt. 
She did no more than 
The court appeared to be impressed that a woman could wield a 
sledgehammer. This is an unrealistic attitude enough, since 
many young couples do much physical labour on their houses. 
Janet's contribution, I submit, is not "much more than many 
wives would do". It is too unrealistic to say sh= would not 
have worked except for a share of the house. 
Q.975) 1 W.L.R. 1338; 
P. 1341 , 791 
(1975) 3 All E.R. 768. 
(56) P.1342, 772. 
Many people will break up concrete as a favour to a friend. 
There was some evidence of an agreement to share here, this 
is unusual. If a resulting trust was found, as Browne L.J. 
and Brightman J seem to have done, then Janet would need to 
have made a contribution e quivalent to one quarter of the 
house's value. If it was a constructive trust, then no 
precise evaluation of contributions and no agreement is 
necessary. 
On either view, the law requires that the claimant has 
contributed, above and beyond performing what the average 
de facto wife does as her share of the relationship. The 
court must find that both parties consciously thought over 
their property rights and planned to alter their legal 
position. This is a strict requirement which most couples 
will not satisfy. So, as here, the court will seize on any 
contribution to prov e these absurd hypotheses and do 
substantial justice. In this case, Mr. Eves had remarried 
and was not paying maintenance for the children. As A. Bissett-
Johnson coyly asked: "Could it be that the decision to find 
the implied trust might have been influenced by a subconscious 
desire by the court to be able to make a secured affiliation 
order or (sic) order for a lump s um?" {57) 
(57) "Mistress's Right to a Share 1.n the 'Matrimonial Home' ". (1975) 
125 New L.m. 614, 615. 
IX Another View. 
The case of Richards v. Dove (58) is interesting because, 
like Cowcher, it was not decided by Lord Denning. On the 
facts, Walton J. decided that the mistress had not 
contributed to the house. Nonetheless, he considered some 
broad general principles. (59) He appeared to accept Lord 
Denning's proposition that when two people acquire property 
by their joint efforts for their joint use, the court may 
find a trust. Yet in practice his view of the proposition is 
closer to the House of Lords, since the claiming party's 
efforts must be aimed at the acquisition, not just at every-
day sharing. So substantial indirect contributions, such as 
paying housekeeping expenses, would give a share only if they 
are made with the aim of acquiring an interest. 
Merely contributing substantial sums is not enough. Likewise, 
he .accepts Lord Denning's view that the time for determining 
shares is when the parties separate, but only because all 
the parties' behaviour till this point may be evidence o f 
their intentions. He distinctly rules out the possib ility of 
a "wavering e quity", whereby the shares would change in 
different circumstances!
60
1s the court thought fit. 
He takes a more conservative v iew of mistresses. He accepts 
that the same principles apply to them, but says that 
applying the principles may produce di f ferent results for de 
facto and legal spouses. This is because the husband has legal 
duties to maintain his wife. I would submit that since the 
trust relies purely on intention, the fact that both parties 
know the husband has duties may well affect their intentions. 
When the husband is doing no more than his duty, extra 
contribution by a wife may tend to show an intention that she 
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This was what Lord Denning was apparently envisaging 
in such a case as Heseltine. 
But the relationship is relevant only insofar as it affects 
the parties' intentions. On the facts as he found them 
walker J. 's view of the parties' rights is clearly correct. 
Miss Richards did not even try to appeal. 
X Should De facto spouses Have Legal Protection? 
clea rly, the law is in a state of flux and uncertainty. The 
courts are using the law of trusts to help de facto and legal 
spouses to acquire shares in the property. This is perhaps 
unfortunate since it conceals the true problem which is 
peculiar to couples living together. The real issue is the 
changing roles of the sexes in the family (61). The law is 
moving from a position where a woman has rights only through 
her husband, to a position where a couple are more like 
e qual partners, e qually capable of owning property and with 
mutual duties. It is more in accord with a twentieth century 
view of marriage to say that the couple both own the house. 
During the last century it was probably generally felt that 
the house was the husband's, though he owed the wife duties. 
Yet e quality is not yet so generally accepted that the wife 
will be prima facie assumed to have a half-share. The 
Matrimonial Property Bill 1975 shows the law merging towards 
this view. The provisions for joint family homes was a 
warningof change to come. 
Changing patterns of land- holding are also relevant. The 
average couple will both work before marriage, and maybe at 
the beginning of it, or until they have children. They will 
both need to save to afford a house. The house will be bought 
with the help of a mortgage, and even if the wife does not 
work for money it will be rarely that she is not called on to 
contribute in some way. Couples often to their own decorating 
and improvements. They need to work together on the house, and 
it seems fair that both should get a share of it in return for 
the work they have done. So there has been a general trend 
towards recognising and d irectly rewarding such contributions 
by women. Where a woman felt that she should be rewarded in 
the same way as him. The trend has now continued with pressure 
to recognise women's indirect and non-monetary contributions. 
(61) See Lord Hodson in Pettitt at 811. The wife's lack of rights 
in the property is compensated by the husband's duty to maintain 
her. Lord Denning in Button at 461, 1066 said that the husband, 
in return for his work, received rent-free lodginas and did not 
need to provide a home for his wife. 
These sorts of arguments show how ones whole understanding 
of property rights rests on assumptions about what 
marriage means. 
Is the plight of the de facto spouses such that they too need 
the law's help? The law has traditionally been reluctant to 
protect them for reasons of public policy. It feared that 
giving them rights would attack the sanctity of marriage. 
Lately there has been a growing social recognition of de factos, 
and their position is more and more being e quated with that of 
mar~ied couples. De facto relationships of one year are 
recognised for tax privileges, 
and accident compensation. 
social security, superannuation 
There has been a world-wide shift in attitudes to marriage and 
the sexes. This is one area in which the law seems to be 
following this trend and recognising de factos. I would submit 
that this is the more realistic view. The law must reflect 
society's values. If de factos are becoming acceptable, the 
law must recognise this when it assesses their dealings. The 
law may disapprove, but it is not entitled to penalise them by 
depriving them of what is generally thought should be theirs. 
Moreover, the argument that if the law protects de facto 
marriages, then no one will get married is unrealistic. 
The modern view is that marriage for such reasons should not be 
encouraged. It is not a usual motive. When a couple plan to 
live together permanently they are not deterred by property 
considerations. They think the problem will not arise because 
they will stay together. They behave just like spouses. The 
law cannot stand alone against the tide and assess property 
rights by values which society no longer holds. It must, and 
has, already begun to accept the facts and try to treat them as 
the average citizen would feel as fair. 
The New Zealand case of Fraser v. Gough (62) was, like Richards 
v. Dove, decided before Eves. The couple had lived together 
for fifteen years, during which they parted three times. 
(62) (197 5) 1 N. Z. L. R.138 (S.C.) 
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They were disputing the ownership of three properties registered 
in Miss Fraser's name. She had contributed £1170, he £500. Both 
had worked to improve the properties and contributed e qually to 
the costs of improvements. She planned and managed the venture. 
The court have him a third share. 
White J. purported to follow Cooke v. Head, quoting Lord 
Denning's words at page 41, 520, criticised above. Yet he 
himself gave a conservative analysis of the law. He found a 
resulting trust in proportion to the parties' contributions, (63) 
and nearly in proportion to their monetary contributions. He 
found there was actually an intention to share in proportion to 
contributions. (63) 
He took into account contributions after purchase in fixing 
the share. He moiay have thought these showed a new trust had 
been formed. He may have thought that this trust was formed 
with the intention that these contributions should be made. He 
may have thought that this was the sort of trust Lord Diplock 
had visualised: the parties fixed a formula of shares in 
proportion to contributions but left calculation till later. It 
is not clear which alternative White J. intended; he does not 
discuss this point. 
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the case is that the 
plaintiff never even alleged that the immorality would make 
the trust void. One possible reason is that there were three 
properties and the parties treated them as a business venture. 
It is more appropriate and easy to imply a conscious intention 
to share in such a case (e.g. Jansen). A second reason may be 
that here the man was claiming a share. It is less easy to 
imply that he gave immoral consideration for his share than 
that a woman did. 
(63) P. 144. 
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Even so, it is significant that the point was not argued. The 
court casually commented: 
"Considered as a question of fact as 
and this woman, as would be the case 
had been man and wife .•. " ( 64) " 
between this man 
if the parties 
It is not 
surprising to find parties to 'a former de facto union 
now terminated' in much the same position as the parties 
to a broken marriage." (65) 
This shows the rapid shift in attitudes to sex and marriage in 
the last twenty years. 
There is still, however, a vast legal and social difference 
between married and unmarried couples. The law should 
recognise this. For one thing, the parties are not under the 
same legal duties to each other. No maintenance can be awarded 
for a de facto spouse. De facto relationships are intrinsically 
different from marriages in that the parties have not been 
prepared to make the final commitment to each other of marriage, 
of taking on legal duties towards each other and of binding 
themselves and all their worldly goods to each other for life. 
This could be taken to show that the couple intend to keep 
their property rigidly separate, or else that any major 
contribution to the other's property must have been made in 
return for a share. This latter interpretation seems to me to 
rate the couple's generosity too low and their legal awareness 
to high. It involves the undesirable position of interest. 
The cases show that the former explanation is not always tr~e. 
De facto unions may involve a total merging of property or none 
at all. 
So de facto marriages can not be ·'-reated in exactly the same way 
as legal marriages, but the parties need some legal protection 
and redistribution of property rights. 
(64) P. 141. 
(65) P. 144. 
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XI Is the Trust A Suitable Method? 
The real question is whether the law of trusts is an appropriate 
solution to the problem, which the cases show exists. I submit, 
and have tried to show in this paper, that the law of trusts was 
not designed to cope with the unique problems of matromonial 
or de facto property and is not very well adapted to it. 
XI-A The Present Law-Resulting Trusts. 
Resulting trusts are obviously unsuitable. They give definite 
shares, subject to the minor problem of evaluating non-
financial contributions, but they rely on the parties' 
intentions. The House of Lords has refused to dispense with 
this requirement. As Lord Evershed M.R. pointed out in Silver 
v. Silver (66)any attempt to ascribe to spouses living together 
an intention to allocate to each other stated proportions of a 
home is surrounded by "a certain air of unreality." It forces 
the courts into injustices or fictions. It is also positively 
unfair. A "sophisticated" claimant will recover where an honest 
one would fail, as Lord Reid points out in Gissing. The success 
of a claim may well depend on the judge's willingness to infer 
an agreement, on whether he is "strong" or "weak". Moreover, 
intention really ought not to be relevant. The court should 
not award a remedy to those couples who thought the matter out, 
but not reward a hard-working, trusting and not legally-minded 
spouse. Resulting trusts have a very valid place in law, but 
they are not adequate to deal with the peculiarly complex and 
informal position of de facto spouses. 
{66) Cl958J 1 W.L.R. 259, 262; D.958) 1 All E.R. 523, 525 (C.A.) 
One of the strongest indications of the unsuitability of 
the present law of trusts,in effect the law of resulting 
trusts, is its widespread evasion and distortion by the 
courts. As long as the law does not protect de facto 
spouses adequately, they will appeal to the courts to 
misinterpret the law and do them j•ustice. Notwith-
standing judicial warnings or yearnings for theoretical 
purity, the lower courts at least will help. It is 
undesirable that the court has to resort to twisted mis-
interpretations of the facts or devious reasoning to 
achieve what it, as representative of the average citizen, 
sees as justice. The present law of resulting trusts is 
riddled with fictions. What is worse, these do not always 
achieve justice. Sometimes, black is so obviously black 
that even Lord Denning could not interpret it as white. 
An anomaly under the present law is the effect of fault. 
Once a trust has been declared the parties' conduct is 
irrelevant. So adultery or other matrimonial offences will 
not affect a spouse's title. This is the position under the 
Matrimonial Property Act 1963, but not under the Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1963. The modern trend is away from emphasis 
in fault, to merely splitting property by reference to 
contributions which are directly relevant to the property. 
Unmarried couples do not have the same legal duties to each 
other, so it is harder for them to sin against each other in 
law and fault becomes irrelevant to the law. It is nonethe-
less anomalous that a spouse can be penalised for misconduct, 
while a de facto spouse cannot. I would submit that conduct 
should only be relevant to maintenance, not to property 
rights. But if one wanted to resolve the anomaly by making 
conduct, or glaring misconduct, relevant to the division of 
de factos' property, one could imply a term in the trust 
penalising fault. I would regard this as not only undesirable, 
but as heaping unreality upon unreality. 
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No couple, surely, would calculate their property interests 
and also the effect on them of different kinds of faults. 
The law of resulting trusts has been vastly extended from 
its original application purely to direct financial 
contributions. It is still not a suitable or satisfactory 
solution to the problems of de facto spouses. To persevere 
in using it is a disservice to the couples concerned, and 
could also confuse the law of resulting trusts. 
XI-B The Constructive Trust. 
Pettitt and Gissing fixed definite limits on the use of 
resulting trusts as a remedy for de facto or married couples. 
Eves v. Eves saw the court turning instead to constructive 
trusts. The House of Lords spoke with reference to a trust 
between couples, which might be either resulting or 
constructive. On their face, the judgements would there-
fore apply to any development of the trust between couples. 
It is rather legalistic, but perfectly possible, to argue 
that the law-lords were speaking of the usual sort of trust 
between couples, which had most of the features of resulting 
trusts. One could then postulate the birth of a new and 
different sort of trust between couples - the constructive 
trust. This would not be affected by the limitations imposed 
by the House of Lords. Eves v. Eves may well be the start of 
such a development. 
Is the law of constr uctive trusts a ~easible method of dealirg 
with the problems of de facto spouses' property? At the 
present, the law of constructive trusts consists of various 
separate categories, into one of which a claimant must fit 
himself. As D. Wilson described it, 
"The instances in which a constructive trust is found 
may represent no more than a collection of unrelated 
examples of e quity's tendency to legal gymnastics in 
the search for justice". (67) 
(67) "The Constructive Trust" research paper, Victoria 
University of Wellington 1975, P.13. 
He ultimately concluded that all the classes of constructive 
trust were based on a breach of fiduciary relationship. (68) 
This view requires such a wide definition of "fiduciary", to 
cover cases like Hussey v. Palmer, that it must become 
almost meaningless. This happens to any attempt to pin down 
the essence of a constructive trust to one simple test ., Let 
us abandon the search and look at the categories instead. 
The categories are not closed, but the court is fairly 
to extend them. 
So in Eves v. Eves, Lord Denning commented: 
"Equity is not past the age of child bearing. One of 
her latest progeny is a constructive trust of a new 
model. " ( 69) 
To which the locical reply is Bagnall J's: 
"(Equity's) progeny must be legitimate - by 
precedent out of principle." (70) 
If the courts have the power to extend the law of constructive 
trusts to include the category of couples' property, the 
question becomes whether they should. A. Bissett-Johnson sums 
up one side of the argument: 
"if the court wants to extend the law of trusts to ... 
give mistresses a share in the home to which they are 
not entitled under the ordinary law of trusts, then 
these matters, which involve important questions about 
marriage and society, are better left to ~arliament than 
to judicial law reform. '' 
While this is very well in theory, if Parliament shows no 
signs of activity, or if the court can do as good a job as 
Parliament, 
New Zealand, 
then there is no objection to it doing so. In 
The Matrimonial Property Bill 1975 saw Parliament 
tackling the problem, 
the courts would not, 
to tackle the problem. 
ibid, P.38 
P.13 41, 771. 
at least in some respects. Moreover, 
I submit, be as competent as Parliament 
(68) 
( 69) 
(70) Cowcher v. Cowcher 430, 948. 
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Any solution would need to be fairly certain, to avoid 
litigation and contention, while the constructive trust is 
essentially discretionary. In New Zealand, family problems 
have usually been dealt with by giving the court a wide 
discretion. This has obvious advantages, especially where 
personality is the vital question, as in custody or 
guardianship cases. Sometimes it is unavoidable. Since New 
Zealand will not directly limit a testator's right to dispose 
of his property, every case where this right is limited must 
be treated as an individual exception under the Family 
Protection Act 1955. The frequent granting of wide discretion 
doubtless reflects the individualism of the common-law. 
Yet the drawbacks, principally uncertainty and increased 
litigation, sometimes outweigh the advantages. This was 
recognised by the Matrimonial Property Bill 1975. In the 
field of matrimonial property, the confusion became such that 
definite satisfactory rules for division, on the continental 
mould, were felt to be preferable. Property is one of the 
more straightforward and least personal of family problems. 
It is therefore particularly suited to codification. This is 
as true for de facto couples as for married ones. 
The solution must establish clear but flexible rules, which 
take all the relevant factors into account. These would 
include the couple's understanding, their needs, and their 
contributions. To achieve any certainty, the courts would 
need to work out a formula which included and balanced all 
these factors. This would take time, as the courts developed 
their theories from case to case. 
such a formula instantly. 
Parliament could achieve 
These obstacles are not insuperable. The constructive trust 
could doubtless be used as a remedy for de facto spouses. 
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But they are good reasons for preferring statutory 
intervention. Perhaps the most powerfu 1 obstacle of all 
is legal conservatism. The courts are unlikely to extend 
constructive trusts in the immediate future. Lord Denning's 
attempts to do so have been disapproved of in cases such as 
Carly v. Farrelly. This reluctance to make radical changes 
is one of the exasperating strengths of the judicial system, 
the concomitant o f its stability. While 0. Kahn-Freund 
lamented the decisions in Pettitt and Gissing, he admitted: 
"The courts cannot, and perhaps ought not to be the 
agents of this reform. Pettitt v. Pettitt and Gissinq v. 
Gissing have shown the inability of the courts so to 
apply the existing legal framework as to make it a 
reliable tool for the necessary adjustment." (72) 
(72) "Recent Legislation on Matrimonial Property" (1970) 
33 M.L.R. 601, 628. 
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XII Alternative Solutions. 
If the present law of trusts is not suitable, and constructive 
trusts should not or will not be used instead, what form should 
statutory intervention take? This concluding section of the 
paper considers what aims are desirable. It looks at the 
Matrimonial Property Bill 1975, the pending legislation which 
deals with de facto spouses' property rights. 
De facto relationships vary widely, far more so than marriages. 
They range from brief passionate affairs to stable unions of 
many years with grown-up children. So an automatic division of 
de factos' property may be widely unsuitable. Neither of the 
parties may have wanted or visualised this. It is probably 
some such consideration which has led judges to think that an 
intention to marry is relevant. It may show an intention to 
share, and negate a clear acknowldgement of the couple's 
separate legal and property interests. 
The Matrimonial Property Bill 1975 tries to recognise the 
differences by applying only to couples who have lived to-
gether for two or more years. This blanket distinction 
dodges the questions. Any relationship of two years would 
give property rights, subject to an unfettered discretion in 
the judge. This is not fair to the judge, who must do what 
he thinks just but has no guide-lmes as to even which factors 
are relevant. It will inevitably create a muddled and uncertain 
law. I would also quarrel with fixing the limit at two years. 
Quite a few relationships of this length do not imply 
commitment, permanence or any merging of property and 
interests, nor do they put the couple 1.n any insuperable 
position of mutual dependence. Marriages of under three years 
would not suffice to transfer property rights (73), 
anomalous that de facto relationships should. 
(73) clause 12 (2) (a). 
so it is 
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The bill is in this respect inconsistent and does not consider 
the problems fully. It makes a clumsy sweeping change in the 
law, but leaves the judges to wor k out its rules and 
applications. The bill must rest on a generalisation about 
the average de facto spouses;, I am complaining that it is 
too inflexible and does not validly reflect even the 
majority of cases. 
How, then, can the line be drawn? Which de facto spouses' 
need or deserve help? I would submit that any de facto 
spouse who contributed to the couple's prosperity deserves a 
share of it. 
The simplest method to achieve this is to redefine by statute 
"contributions" where family trusts are concerned, much as 
the Matrimonial Property Bill 1975 does. This would not help 
those de facto spouses who did not contribute even to the 
extent of being a good housekeeper or bringing up the children. 
And I feel that as a general rule this is just. When two 
people live together, with no undertaking to share everything, 
and one makes no great contribution, the law should not 
interfere to give him one. 
This generalisation must now be qualified. A major 
contribution of money or labour in even a short relationship 
should give a share. Housekeeping, contributing money, or 
making any other long-term and steady contribution, should 
give a share only if it is performed over a sufficient period 
of time for the contribution to amount to something substantial. 
Furthermore, even a non-contributing de facto spouse may be 
entitled to a share jf he has given a large part of his life to 
the relationship. This is not a question of rewarding effort 
fairly. Rather it is to say that when a long-standing joint 
venture and relationship breaks up, 
adequately provided for. 
the parties must be 
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One could argue that a contribution of twenty, or even ten 
years is in itself major, but the real justification is 
necessity. The Bill's definition of "contribution" could be 
amended to give effect to this. 
My main criticism of the Bill, then, is its readiness to hand 
over property. The basic assumption, I feel, is a good one, 
that family property must be dealt with by different rules. I 
would submit that the better approach would be to require a de 
facto claimant to prove contributions, as at the present, but 
to define them roughly as the Bill does. This would prevent 
automatic upheavals in property rights from shorter relation-
ships, if any de facto spouse could prove he had contributed 
in any way, such as by raising the children, he would be 
entitled to a share. Evaluating the contribution would be 
something of a problem and a source of contention. For long-
term relationships, it would be suitable to reverse the onus 
and assume the parties had contributed equally. This could be 
done after five or ten years of continuous living together. 
Contributing, say ten or twenty years to a relationship should, 
except in exceptional circumstances, be deemed a contribution. 
Even if the terms of the state are fixed differently from this 
suggestion, some sort of statutory intervention is necessary 
to sort out the present confusion. While the courts' 
intentions were pure, and their actions no doubt approximated 
more closely to justice than inaction would have, the present 
form of trust is really not a suitable remedy for the de facto 
spouse's problems. 
Where the couple has agreed on a solution themselves, the 
court should respect this. Such a view is in accordance with 
the court's policy of encouraging private settlements of 
disputes. It is the law for married couples. 
. .. /37 
Moreover, it is surely fair. If the couple carried on their 
relationship on the basis of a certain legal understanding, 
they should honour their undertakings. If necessary, the 
court should force the reluctant partner to do so. 
.. .,,. . . .. . . 
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